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The range and extent of Jean-Paul Sartre's wntmgs. as everyone
knows. is remarkable. Philosophy, novels, plays. essays, biographies.
literary and art criticism. autobiography, diaries and interviews.
political, cultural and social commentary: his writings in these many
fields constitute an immense output, much of it of high quality, and
very little without interest. Of course, there is dispute about his
standing as a thinker; but. even in the long period of eclipse since his
death in 1980, there is no denying the significance of his major
publications. However, for all the impressive diversity of these writings
and the fame attached to them. it is also true that Sartre enjoys a
reputation as one who failed to write certain things. This specific
notoriety is connected with his failure to complete a number of major
projects for which he had given a specific undertaking.
Famously, Sartre concluded Being and Nothingness (published
in 1943) with the promise to devote a future work to the ethical
implications of his ontology. In the following years he compiled
extensive preliminary notes on ethical questions, but the project was
finally abandoned before the end of the decade and the notes remained
unpublished until after his death} No less famously, he failed to
complete the promised second volume of the Critique of Dialectical
Reason (the first volume of which was published in 1960); in this case
too there was a lengthy manuscript which. again, was eventually
published only after his death.2 The publication of the Critique also
gave rise to further attempts to deal with ethical themes, in the form of
notes for lectures in the mid-I 960s; but these writings (so far) remain
unpublished. Finally, among the major non-publications. Sartre did
not complete the promised study of Madame Bovary, which had long
been projected as the necessary conclusion to his massively long work
on Flaubert, The Idiot of the Family, three volumes of which were
published in the early 1970s.
These unfulfilled promises-and others such as his breaking off
the series of novels The Roads 10 Freedom or the failure to complete
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his autobiography Words as originally intended-are often
commented on in the retrospective interviews which Sartre gave in
the 1970s. His general response was that the situation did not bother
him at all because, as he said, 'all works remain unfinished: no-one
who undertakes a work of literature or philosophy ever finishes. What
can I say-time never stops!'3 With reference to the work on Flaubert
in particular, he took the convenient view that he had said the important
things in the first three volumes and that 'someone else could write
the fourth on the basis of the three I have written'.4 But it is also clear
that, in this case especially, unfinished business did bother him, since
he added immediately that he felt a kind of remorse about the
unfinished Flaubert; and, if he supposed that it could be written
readily by someone else, he also acknowledged that it was, for him,
the most difficult part of the work.
We know about Sartre's unfinished work largely because he was
so open about his projects; with more guarded writers, the question
why they did not write something or other might not arise. In accounting
for the situation as a whole, one can refer, of course, to the standard
considerations that Sartre took up projects and set them aside, if need
be, in response to conditions set by a changing world; that he had
many interests and embraced too many tasks; that, like many writers
and philosophers, he was divided between the theoretical and the
practical life; that he held work back from publication when he was
unhappy with it; and that his health failed as he grew older (a factor
which particularly affected the work on Flaubert and finally made its
completion impossible). But there is a deeper significance, both real
and symbolic, in the three major instances of Sartre's unfinished
work. This is related to the character of his original ontology in which
the human being is conceived as engaged fundamentally in the
obviously incompletable task of becoming God; against this standard,
the individual is a whole which is forever incomplete, a detotalized
totality. But the problem of incompleteness is related even more
significantly to the task of giving a comprehensive account of social
relations which he set for himself in his later social theory, to be
achieved on the basis of the fundamental method of inquiry which he
sought to apply both in the Critique of Dialectical Reason and in the
study of Flaubert, The Family Idiot.
The method of inquiry, which is proposed as a method for
understanding both individual and social reality, and indeed history as
a whole, is set out in the relatively short text Search for Method
(first published in 1957). Sartre said of himself that he had 'a passion
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for understanding human beings'. Characertistically for him, this
meant understanding individuals, very particular individuals in fact,
and above all writers. What he came to recognise, soon after the
publication of Being and Nothingness, is that to understand particular
individuals or events fully one must be able to give an account of the
social order, the epoch, the history of the time; and this leads on to the
need for an account of how one time fits with another and, subsequently,
of the shape of history as a whole. What he sought to provide, then, is
a comprehensive method by which one might hope to understand
individual persons or particular events, on the one hand, and the whole
of history on the other.
The path to this end was smoothed by the conviction that an
individual is never just an individual: each person is shaped by, and is
an expression, of universal history and their epoch; at the same time,
each person contributes to the history of which they are part. From the
early 1960s, Sartre came to express this idea in the phrase 'singular
universal' and the reverse formulation 'universal singular'. The idea,
in summary, is that individuals reflect the universal features of their
time and, conversely, that the universals of an age are realised concretely
and singularly by individuals. His first use of the term 'singular
universal', so far as I can ascertain, is in the Critique of Dialectical
Reason, though here the individual disappears from historical categories
and is seen only as 'the methodological point of departure (whose)
short life soon becomes diluted in the pluridimensional human
ensemble'.5
There is a rather different emphasis in the prominent use of the
phrase in his paper 'The Singular Universal', given at a UNESCO
colloquium on Kierkegaard in 1964;6 and this emphasis on the
individual as a universal was taken up at considerably greater length in
The Family Idiot. Sartre presents the Flaubert work as a sequel to
Searchfora Method, which was first published, as noted, in 1957 and
then incorporated as the prelude to the Critique ofDialectical Reason
in 1960. Sartre's basic question in Search for a Method is: 'Do we
have today the means to constitute a structural, historical anthropology?'
-in effect, the desired comprehensive theory of history, the
expression of his passion for understanding human beings; and, with
acknowledgement to Marx and Hegel, he announces that: 'if such a
thing as Truth can exist in anthropology, it must be a truth that has
become, and it must .make itself a totalization.'? The more specific
question which introduces the Flaubert study and constitutes its general
subject is: 'what at this point in time, can we know about a man?'s
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This question, it is suggested, could only be answered by studying
a specific case. Such a study, he is aware, runs the risk of ending up as
no more than a collection of different kinds of infonnation about a life
and a time, 'layers of heterogeneous and irreducible meanings'; the
presupposition is that the great task, whether one is trying to make
sense of an individual life or of history as a whole, is to discover (or
perhaps to create) its unity or totality. Sartre's conviction is that his
work will show that the irreducibility of meanings is only apparent,
that the parts all fit together as a whole with profound homogeneity.
To understand an individual is to grasp a whole period of history; to
understand history is to grasp the specific fonns in which it is realized
in individual lives. The search for a structural, historical anthropology
and the truth of history can be undertaken, in effect, through a properly
constructed biography of a single individual. The fundamental argument
is expressed as follows at the beginning of the work on Flaubert:
For a man is never an individual; it would be more fitting to call him a
universal singular. Summed up and for this reason universalized by
his epoch, he in tum resumes it by reproducing himself in it as
singularity. Universal by the singular universality of human history.
singular by the universalizing singularity of his projects, he requires
simultaneous examination from both ends.9
What is indicated, in short, is the twofold regressive-progressive
method of inquiry originally set out in Search for a Method as the
basis for a structural, historical anthropology in which existentialism
was to be incorporated as a subsidiary element in the Marxist theory of
history. But the projection towards the individual was already
announced in that work in the observation that this is a method of
continuous cross-reference. an examination from both ends in effect,
which 'will progressively detennine a biography (for example) by
examining the period, and the period by studying the biography'.10
The power of a method of inquiry needs to be sought in its details,
in the scope of its application and, obviously, in what it yields. But in
general, the idea of a pattern of understanding, moving backwards and
forwards between specific aspects of individuals or particular events
and their general social and historical context, seems eminently sensible.
This is irrespective of any larger theory to which the regressive-
progressive practice might be attached, allowing that, in the case of
Sartre, the desire for a comprehensive theory is never far away. The
idea of the 'singular universal', in conjunction with the method which
reveals it. is to be understood primarily in tenns of the notion of
meaning, specifically, meaning as applied to a lived process or totality
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such as a life or a project or an action. For meaning in this sense, Sartre
uses the term sens as distinct from signification which is normally
reserved for the meaning of concepts or terms. The distinction was
invoked originally in his thought in an aesthetic context in relation, for
example, to the meaning of a painting or a piece of music. Signification
is effected by signs, that is to say, bearers of meaning which direct our
attention beyond themselves to whatever they signify; an object with
sens, by contrast, is a primary focus of attention (and understanding):
I would say that an object has a meaning (sens) when it is the
incarnation of a reality which goes beyond it but which cannot be
grasped apart from it and whose infinity does not allow expression in
any system of signs; what is involved is always a case of totality: the
totality of a person, a milieu. an epoch. the human condition. I I
In the original aesthetic context, Sartre speaks for example of the
Mona Lisa as capturing the spirit of the Renaissance; or he notes the
way in which a Brandenburg concerto, a Scarlatti sonata or a work by
Schumann or Ravel express in their different ways their respective
epoch and its understanding of the world. But already there is the idea
that a person, as a totality, embodies meaning along the same lines. It
is precisely this idea which was taken up in the notion of the singular
universal. This can be seen clearly in two key passages in which he
introduces the term in his paper on Kierkegaard:
To live original contingency is to surpass it. The human being,
irremediable singularity. is the being through whom the universal
comes into the world; once fundamental chance starts to be lived, it
assumes the form of necessity. Lived experience [Ie vecu]. we discover
in Kierkegaard. is made up of non-significant accidents of being in
so far as they are surpassed towards a significance Ivers un sens] they
did not possess at the beginning. and which I will call the singular
universal. 12
The human being is that being who transforms his being into meaning
[sens], and through whom meaning [sens] comes into the world. The
singular universal is this meaning [sens].13
The general framework of the idea is as follows. We live within
what Sartre, following Merleau-Ponty, calls envelopment, the wrapping
of a world, especially a social, historical order, which shapes us and
determines 'the limits within which real modifications are possible'.
Thus, for example, 'Kierkegaard was a Dane, born at the beginning
of the last century into a Danish family, and conditioned by Danish
history and culture'; 14 a particular religion produced him, a religion
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from which he could not pretend to emancipate himself though others
of his background did; and it is uni versally agreed that he was marked
by a complex disposition of which the kernel was some sort of sexual
anomaly.ls Such observations are part of an analytic or regressive
movement which help to place the individual, in this case Kierkegaard,
in his universal setting. The point is expressed epigrammatically in the
suggestion that 'a human being carries a whole epoch within him,just
as a wave carries the whole of the sea'.
Within the framework of a universal envelopment, Sartre portrays
the individual as an anchorage who turns 'this universality into a
particular situation and this common necessity into an irreducible
contingency';16 furthermore, 'because of the necessity of anchorage,
there can be no incarnation of the universal other than in the irreducible
opacity of the singular'.17 The emphasis on singularity and contingency
in the account is set (supposedly at least) in contrast with the Hegelian
conception of the individual as essentially a dialectical incarnation of
the universal moment. The irreducible contingency lies originally in
the singularity of the conditionings in which the individual comes to
be within the general framework, especially the conditions of their
particular childhood milieu. But then, the individual acts, and thereby
surpasses contingency and makes a life characterised in one way or
another by a unified meaning; in aesthetic terms, we each tell a
story or create a work of art in living our lives; in this way, original
contingency becomes necessity in the act which gives it a human
meaning [sens humain] and which 'makes of it a singular relationship
to the Whole, a singular embodiment of the ongoing totalization
which envelops and produces it' .18 To give meaning in this sense is
to effect a synthetic totalization of scattered chance occurrences, to
become a singular universal within the enveloping universal of the
epoch and of history as a whole.
In Kierkegaard's case the meaning-giving process consisted
centrally in the way in which he lived, and expressed in his writings,
ideas about sin, dread, freedom, finitude, subjectivity, and passion. In
a corresponding sense, for someone now to trace this development and
to explore these ideas is to engage, by a process of reduplication or
doubling, in a synthetic or progressive movement which will reveal
the singular way in which he reproduced in his lived relationships
the universal features of his epoch. 'What is Kierkegaard's body of
work', Sartre asks, 'but himself in so far as he is a universal?' An
answer to the question 'what can we know about a human being?'
-about Kierkegaard or Flaubert for example-thus moves in a
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regressive-progressive pattern from universal to singular and back
to the universal. This pattern of understanding, Sartre suggests, may
almost certainly be credited to Kierkegaard himself: 'Kierkegaard
was perhaps the first to show that the universal enters History as a
singular, in so far as the singular institutes itself in it as a universal' .19
In summary, Sartre's methodological proposal can be seen as an
appropriate or even necessary framework for a biography or for social
and historical inquiry generally. In the case of Kierkegaard, Sartre
sets out the method and applies the twofold movement, albeit in a
concentrated and incomplete way, in the space of 20 to 30 pages. In
the case of Flaubert, the same pattern of inquiry was to ruil to over
3000 pages and was to remain incomplete even so, taken up to a
considerable extent with the original task of placing Flaubert in his
family relations and his time. The difference between the two studies
could be treated as a matter of degree in the details of a life: not much
detail in what, after all, was a conference paper on Kierkegaard, and a
great deal about Flaubert in what was, in a sense, the work of a
lifetime. What is at issue more sharply is the impossible Sartrean
ambition which is tied to the otherwise sensible regressive-progressive
method, viz., the conviction that everything can in principle be known
about a life or a period of history, and that if one can provide a
complete summation of the data, then one will have achieved a
synthesis in which everything will finally be clear:
The most important project in the Flaubert is to show that
fundamentally everything can be communicated. that without being
God, but simply as a man like any other. one can manage to understand
another man perfectly, if one has access to all the necessary elements.20
The study of Flaubert, for all its interest, is a monument to the
failure of this conviction and of the attempt to effect a comprehensive
implementation of the method. The very same problems are apparent
in the failure to complete the second volume of the Critique of
Dialectical Reason and also, I think, the promised work on ethics.
But to show this more clearly, it is necessary to consider the task as
Sartre conceived it, the method of inquiry, and the application of its
component elements in more detail. At the same time, the focus




The task, as I have already emphasised, is comprehension or
understanding, specifically in the sense of understanding a particular
action, the life of a human being, an epoch, and finally history as
a whole. For all his renowned pessimism, Sartre was surprisingly
optimistic about the possibility of carrying out this task at its various
levels of totalization. The first stage seems comparatively straight-
forward. In Search for a Method, he suggests that our capacity to
grasp the meaning of a piece of human conduct does not involve a
particular talent or special faculty of intuition: 'this knowing is simply
the dialectical movement which explains the act by its teoninal
signification in teons of its starting conditions' .21 We grasp an action
as a synthetic unity-that is, we grasp its sens-in teons of its goal and
starting conditions, the familiar progressive and regressive movements
respectively: as when we observe someone opening the window to
let air into a crowded room, switching on the light to read when it
is dark, drinking a glass of water to slake their thirst after coming
in on a hot day. We are signifying beings, we live in a world of
signs; we understand our own behaviour inasmuch as comprehension
is 'simply the translucidity of praxis. to' itself ;22 and we understand
others, again as 'a moment of our praxis, a way of living ... the
concrete human relation which unites us to the other' .23 This
confidence is tempered by the recognition that an act may be understood
at more and more complex levels and hence be expressed by a series
of very different meanings. But again there is the conviction that
the various meanings can be unified or totalized: 'what the totalization
must discover ... is the multidimensional unity of the act' .24
In general teons, the same pattern of understanding, built up around
regressive and progressive stages and aspiring to the goal oftotalization
in the grasp of a complex unified meaning, is reiterated at each
successive level: the meaning of a project over time, its outcome (in a
literary work or a musical composition, for example), the meaning
expressed in the course ofa life, the meaning ofa social order, a culture,
an epoch, history as a whole. In each case, the process is conceived
in a spiralling, dialectical fashion in which each element is to be
understood in relation to the others. In the work on Flaubert, Sartre
even foonulates what the philosopher T. R. Flynn calls the 'principle
of totalization in his philosophy of history'25 in the claim that 'a
man ... totalizes his age to the precise degree that he is totalized by it' .26
The precision which is invoked in this principle is manifestly
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spurious for it assumes. among other things. that totalization is
complete in each case and that it can be grasped and measured as a
whole. Even if this were true in some sense for the past, the basic
assumption of an overall unified meaning is problematic. What is
offered, at best, is a general framework of inter-relationship and
understanding: on the one hand. the idea of the social, cultural order as
a concrete universal which incarnates the objective spirit of an age in a
great web of enveloping meanings which shape each part of the whole;
on the other, the idea that the social order and its enveloping meanings
is itself constituted by the specific meanings in which individuals,
in their activities and in relation with one another. constitute general
meaning in specific fonns.
The general picture is one of a vast complex of mediations between
the universal and the singular. Given our existence as signifying
beings in a world of signs, it seems reasonable to suppose that we can
gain a partial understanding of this dialectic; but the ultimate goal of
comprehension to which Sartre aspires would require the complete
and detailed application of the whole range of disciplines which bear
on the mediations of individual and social life in both a structural
and a dynamic (or diachronic) sense: one would need to bring into
play all the social sciences. a comprehensive study of the major
institutions, the fonns of life and practices of an epoch. its art. literature
and popular culture, together with historical studies. both specific
and general, in considerable depth. In a sense, what is called for is
an imaginative but true study of everything (Sartre said of the
Flaubert work: 'I would like my study to be read as a novel ... [but]
with the idea in mind that it is true, that it is a true novel').27 How does
one set out on such a breathtaking and sense-defying project?
Sartre's confidence was based in part on the idea that we have a
general sense of what is required for total understanding: we have, one
could say, the idea of a god's-eye view of history; furthennore, the
general method of inquiry. with its regressive and progressive stages.
is within our grasp; on this basis, his confidence grew out of the
conviction that. just as we can hope to discover the multidimensional
unity of a single act. so we can aspire to bring the plurality of
meanings in a human life, in a culture, and eventually in history, into
overall unity. Thus:
the plurality of the meanings of History can be discovered and posited
for itself only on the ground of a future totalization .... It is our
theoretical and practical duty to bring this totalization closer every
day. All is still obscure, and yet everything is in full light. To tackle
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the theoretical aspect, we have the instruments; we can establish the
method. Our historical task, at the heart of this polyvalent world, is to
bring closer the moment when History will have only one meaning,
when it will tend to be dissolved in the concrete human beings who
will make it in common.28
Sartre carried this confidence into his ambitious study of social
groups and history in the Critique ofDialectical Reason and his hardly
less ambitious study of Flaubert. His failure to complete the works
has to be seen fundamentally as a consequence of the impossible goal
which he set for himself in the first place. The point of failure lies
especially in the progressive or synthetic element of the project. Each
of these large works combines regressive and progressive forms of
inquiry; but in the published volumes, the regressive dimension, which
could be judged to be relatively successful, is dominant. The insoluble
problem arises. predictably. with the task of drawing the data together
into an overall unified account of history. an epoch, or a human life.
This is the task which Sartre set for himself. in regard to history in
volume II of the Critique, and in regard to Flaubert and his time in
the proposed fourth volume of The Family Idiot. His eventual decision
not to publish these works is an acknowledgement that he had failed
to carry out the project (which is not to say that the unpublished
material is without interest or importance). His own comments on the
unfulfilled promises (as noted early in the paper) have a disarming
quality; but it seems that Sartre could not acknowledge the original
flaw in the project of seeking the god-like status of total understanding.
Regressive inquiry consists essentially in an analytic procedure in
which one begins with some agreed data and then works back to
determine their formal and material conditions, their causes and
explanation. So in volume I of the Critique. Sartre sets out to uncover
and analyse the conditions which account for basic social phenomena,
the formation and structure of groups, class identity and social conflict
in particular; finally, after 800 pages, he concluded: 'So far, we have
been trying to get back to the elementary formal structures. and, at the
same time, we have located the dialectical foundations of a structural
anthropology' .29 In other words, the inquiry to this point has been
essentially regressive in character; and the way is now open, he
supposes, to take up at last 'the real problem of History' .
This project promised for volume II (to which he gave the sub-title
The Intelligibility ofHistory) would ofcourse be a progressive inquiry.
a synthetic undertaking which would gather up the vast plurality of
meanings in history and uncover the overall unifying internal meaning
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of social relations and the goal of their development. It would
provide, in short, the final, universal level of understanding which
begins with our grasp of the multi-dimensional unity of a single act.
Not surprisingly, the project defeated him. The unfinished manuscript
consists firstly of an imaginative portrayal of a boxing match as, in
effect, a singular universal which 'incarnates' all boxing and, more
generally, the violence of an exploitative society; in the terms of the
now familiar image, 'a punch, like a dance, is indissolubly singular
and universal'. The other major discussion concerns Stalin's
disastrous attempt to achieve 'socialism in one country', which
Sartre portrays as a singular realization of the universal 'dictatorial'
society. The discussion carries a good deal of interest as far as it
goes; but it could not possibly satisfy the impossible goal which
Sartre set for himself in regard to 'the real problem of history'. Even
in the end, he seemed unable, or unwilling, to recognise this. The
explanation he provided for abandoning the project, while not untrue
or irrelevant, is unconvincing: 'in the second part [of the Critique] it
would be a question, to put it briefly, of explaining what history is:
and I consider that I do not know enough history to undertake
that' .30 He might have known that in the beginning. But then he
would probably not have written the rich, if excessively long, account
of social theory which is found in volume I. In the event, he gave up
the attempt to complete the Critique and turned to the study of
Flaubert, a particular writer, whom he had thought about over a long
period of time and who belonged to an epoch about which he was in
fact generally well informed.
The Family Idiot, like the Critique, is constructed around
regressive and progressive forms of inquiry, with the aim of providing
an account which would explain everything about Flaubert, beginning
with attention to the background conditions in which he became a
writer, a writer of novels, and specifically the novel Madame Bovary;
and going on to examine the way in which his life, as embodied in
his writings, in Madame Bovary in particular, reflected the age of
the Second Empire of which he was part. Once again, regressive
inquiry plays a dominant role in the study, especially in the detailed
investigation of Flaubert's early childhood and his relations to his
parents and his older brother, conditions which, in conjunction with
the age, are seen to lead to his neurosis and passivity and flight to the
imaginary which, in tum, are seen as critical to his development as a
writer of a particular sort in that environment. There is also a good
deal of progressive argument in the study developed around what
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Sartre now calls personalization, which is meant to express the way
in which the individual responds to what is made of him by the sum of
conditioning factors, an outcome which consists in Sartrean terms
in the universalizing singularity effected through one's projects; he
defines it as 'the surpassing and conserving ... at the heart of a
totalizing project of what the world has made-and continues to make
-<>f [the individual)'.3\ This relates, in Flaubert's case, to the way in
which he constructed an imaginary world as a child and eventually
became a writer of novels of a singular universal kind.
The study assembles, analyses and summarises an immense amount
of detail relating to Flaubert and his time gathered around symbolic
key events in his childhood and early adult life, especially his collapse
at the feet of his brother near the Pont L'Eveque early in 1844. But
once again there is an overwhelming gap created by the absence of the
promised totalization of Flaubert as a singular universal within the
overall totalization of the Second Empire. This was to be effected at
each level through a close study of Madame Bovary, concerning
which Flaubert had said 'Madame Bovary, c'est moi'. The general
ambition of writing the biography of a significant individual such as
Flaubert, showing how he was shaped by his environment and how, in
tum, he expressed that world in a singular way, is entirely feasible.
But Sartre set for himself the impossible task of a supreme totalization,
an account which would provide in effect a complete representation of
Flaubert and the epoch in which he lived. In the end, one could say that
the many interesting parts of the study are greater than the whole; in
that light, the failure is far from from total. Again the paradox is that
Sartre would probably not have attempted the feat at all if he had not
tried to do what is impossible. In that case, the failures can be seen as
illustrations of the characteristic Sartrean theme 'loser wins'.
The failure to complete the promised work on ethics can also be
linked with the problem of totalization or unified meaning; but in this
case, Sartre's own explanation in a late interview is considerably more
feasible since it does not rest on the postulate of a grandiose goal of
total understanding. Denying that he ever subscribed to an ethics of
indifference (contrary to the familiar caricature of existentialism),
Sartre says:
I have never had an ethics of indifference. That is not what makes
ethics difficult, but rather the concrete, political problems that have to
be solved... society and knowledge [at present] are not such that we
can rebuild an ethics that would have the same validity as the one we
have gone beyond. For example, we are unable to formulate an ethics
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on the Kantian level that would have the same validity as Kantian
ethics. It cannot be done because the moral categories depend essentially
on the structures of the society in which we live. and these structures
are neither simple enough nor complex enough for us to create moral
concepts.32
Sartre's point is that, in the contemporary fragmented social world.
the task of providing an adequate basis for ethics in common or
universal tenns lies beyond us. In these circumstances he did not
succeed in working out an ethical theory which could meet this goal;
but he continued to acknowledge the theoretical and practical
importance of work on ethical themes and his writings reflect ethical
concern at many different levels.
At the end of the story of his childhood, Sartre presents himself as
shorn of illusions; and he concludes that what was then left was: 'A
whole man, made up of all men, worth all of them, and anyone of
them worth him' .33 This is an egalitarian but abstract image in which
one individual is portrayed as no different from any other. He made
particular use of the image of the individual as 'just anyone'-
'n'importe qui'-in his long and winding account of social relations
in the Critique of Dialectical Reason. But in his passion for
understanding human beings, Sartre was drawn to write about singular
individuals, especially writers or artists-Flaubert. Saint Genet,
Kierkegaard, Mallanne, Tintoretto. He commented in the third volume
of the Flaubert study that 'the epoch makes itselfas the totalization of
a society in opposing itself to itself through thousands of particular
incarnations which struggle among themselves for survival'.34 In the
same breath. he observed that 'an epoch can come to completion in an
individual well before it comes to an end socially'. Perhaps we are all
singular universals in our particular way; but then there are singular
singular universals. Flaubert was such a singular universal in relation
to the Second Empire. We might equally take Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-
1980) as a singular universal of this kind in the troubled history of
France in the twentieth century.
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